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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HARRY ALEXANDER, RALPH H.
ALEXANDER and EVELYN ALEXANDER HOWICK,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.
Case No.
ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, a corporation,

8042

Defendant,

and
HANNAH WILSON ALEXANDER,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a decree entered by the trial
court, sitting without a jury. The facts involved in this
case were not in serious dispute at the trial and the sole
question raised by this appeal is whether or not the tria1
court erred in its application of the law to the facts presented.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they were
beneficiaries under a certain trust agreement dated Jannary 10, 1930, executed by Henry A. Alexander, Emily J.
Alexander and Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company and
an amendment thereto dated July 2, 1940; that certain described property was the subject matter of the alleged trust
and that by its terms the trust was ripe for distribution
to the beneficiaries (R. 1). The complaint further alleged
that liannah \Vilson Alexander, Appellant, claimed an interest in said property adverse to that of plaintiffs'. Plaintiffs prayed that the alleged trust be terminated, the property distributed according to its terms and that the claims
of Hannah \Vilson Alexander be declared invalid and title
quieted against her.
A stipulation was filed by the parties to this action reciting that the defendant Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company had no interest in the controversy herein involved,
and that it should continue to hold said real property as
trustee and to abide by the outcome of this action (R. 17).
Hannah \V ilson Alexander will be referred to in this brief
as Defendant.
Defendant answered plaintiff's complaint denying generally the allegations concerning the trust agreement and
admitting that she asserted a claim in and to said property
adverse and hostile· to plaintiff's claim (R. 9). As a Cross
Complaint, defendant alleged that during his
life time,
.........
Henry A. Alexander purchased from Louis De Young and
Louise S. DeYoung, his wife, the property in question, paid
the full purchase price therefor, and became the owner of
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~

t:

....

...

complete legal and equitable title thereto; that he caused
and directed the sellers to convey legal title to Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company and at all times subsequent
to that time was the owner of full and complete equitable ·
title to said property and was in possession thereof during
his life time and at the time of his death; that at the time
the property was so acquired defendant was the lawful
wife of Henry A. Alexander and survived him as his widow;
that she had at no time parted with or relinquished any
of her right, title, inchoate dower or interest in said property and is and at all times has been the owner in fee
simple of undivided one-third interest of said property.
The Cross-Complaint prayed that her interest in said property be decreed and that the plaintiffs' claim against said
interest be quieted and that the alleged trustee be ordered
to convey to her legal title to an undivided one-third interest in said property. Plaintiffs' Reply in substance denied
the claim of defendant (R. 12).
Subsequent to the commencement of this action, the
parties .entered into an agreement allowing Zion's Savings
Bank & Trust Company to sell the real property and to
hold the proceeds of said sale pending the determination
of this cause (R. 57).
The case was tried by the Court, sitting without a
jury, and after hearing the evidence and arguments of
counsel, the Court granted judgment to the plaintiffs as
prayed in their complaint and ordered that the proceeds
from the real property be distributed fo the plaintiffs as
provided in the trust agreement. It is from the Decree of
the trial court that this appeal is taken.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 10, 1930, Henry A. Alexander and Emily
J. Alexander, his wife, entered into the following agreement with Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company (R. 4) :

TRUST AGREEMENT
TIIIS AGREEMENT made and entered into at
Salt Lake City, Utah, this tenth day of January,
A. D., 1930, by and between HENRY A. ALEXANDER and EMILY J. ALEXANDER, his wife,
of Salt Lake City, Utah, FIRST PARTIES, herein
called "TRUSTORS", and ZION'S SAVINGS BANK
AND TRUST COMPANY, a corporation, of Salt
Lake City, Utah, SECOND PARTY, herein called
"TRUSTEE", WITNESSETH:
THAT, WHEREAS, the said Trustors desire to
create a Trust respecting the property hereinafter
described, for the benefit of the survivor of them,
and for the benefit of their heirs hereinafter named,
and for other reasons;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration
of the foregoing, and of the sum of ONE ($1.00)
DOLLAR in hand paid, receipt whereof is hereby
acknowledged, and of the performance of the terms
of this Trust by the Trustee, the said Trustors have
sold, assigned, transferred, set over and conveyed,·
and by these presents do sell, assign, transfer, set
over and convey unto the said Trustee all of that
certain real estate and personal property described
in a list hereto attached, marked "EXHIBIT A",
hereby referred to and made a part of this trust
agreement.
It is mutually agreed that all of the property
above described, mentioned and refer~ed to· shall be
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called the "TRUST FUND", and that the said Trustors may, at their option, add to said Trust Fund by
depositing with and assigning and conveying to the
Trustee other property, money or securities, and
all such additions shall become a part of the Trust
Fund, and be subject to all of the terms and conditions hereof.
All of the said Trust Fund shall be held and
disposed of by the Trustee strictly for the following uses and purposes and upon the following trusts,
to-wit:
1. Said Trustors hereby expressly reserve unto
themselves, jointly, and to the survivor of them, the
right to receive all of the income from said Trust
Fund, and expressly reserve the- right to revoke and
terminate this Trust in whole or in part at any
time during the joint lives of Trustors, or the lifetime of the survivor of them, and they, and the 'survivor of them, expressly reserve the right to change
the beneficiaries herein named, and to change or
modify the nature of the Trust hereby· created, or
the terms and conditions thereof in any respect.
Such revocation or change shall be in writing signed
by said Trustors, during their joint lifetime, and
thereafter by the survivor of them, or by their attorney-in-fact thereunto duly authorized, but no particular or technical form thereof shall be required,
and no such revocation or change need be acknowledged. Upon the- revocation of this Trust, as above
provided, the Trustee will assign, without recourse,
or quitclaim back to said Trustors, or to such person as they, or the survivor of them, may designate
in such revocation or change, all such property as
may be included within the revocation or change.
2. During the lifetime of said Trustors, and
the survivor of them, all taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, and all other costs, expenses, debts
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and obligations of said Trustors, or either of them,
in connection with the property included in this
Trust, shall be paid by the said Trustors, and the
survivor of them, and the Trustee shall not be responsible or liable in any manner for the nonpayment of any such taxes, assessments, premiums,
costs, expenses, debts and obligations of any name
or nature whatsoever.
3. If, upon the death of the survivor of said
Trustors, this trust shall not have been revoked in
full, as to all of the property covered hereby, then
out of such as shall remain subject to this Trust,
the Trustee shall pay the costs and expenses of the
last sickness and funeral charges of said survivor
and shall deduct for its compensation as Trustee
hereunder such fees and expenses as are usually
charged in like cases; and all of the rest, residue
and remainder of said Trust Fund shall be distributed as follows :
One-half (lh) to HARRY ALEXANDER,
son of Trustors, if he be then living, and if not,
then in equal shares to his then living heirs.
One-half (lf2) to RALPH HENRY ALEXANDER, grandson of Trustors, and EVELYN
JUNE ALEXANDER, granddaughter of Trustors, share and share alike, with the understanding that if said two grandchildren be minors at the time the distribution of the Trust
Fund shall take place, the Trustee shall continue to hold in trust the respective shares to
which said two grandchildren are entitled h~re
under, until they become of legal age, at which
time their respective portions of the Trust Fund
shall be delivered and paid over to them. If, ·
however, before two said grandchildren become
of legal age, Trustee shall ·deem it advisable or
necessary to pay from their respective shares
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for their support, mainte·nance, care or education, authority is hereby vested in said Trustee
to pay such sums and at such times as Trustee
shall, in its business discretion, consider necessary and advisable to supply for said two grandchildren proper care, support, maintenance and
education. In the event that either of said two
grandchildren shall die before receiving the full
portion of the Trust Fund to which he or she is
entitled hereunder, the share of such deceased
grandchild shall go to the surviving grandchild,
if there be a survivor, and if not, then such
share shall go to Harry Alexander, son of Trustor, . . .or his then living heirs.
4. In order that the terms and conditions of
this Trust may be fully consummated, said Trustee
is hereby authorized and empowered to sell any
part or all of the said Trust Fund, at private or
public sale, without notice to or confirmation .of any
court, and is further vested with full power and
authority to comply with all legal- requirements as
to the execution of writings, deeds, leases, assignments,. conveyances and other documents and formalities, without the confirmation of any court; and
is authorized to pay from the Trust Fund all expenses and costs necessary for the fulfillment of this
Trust, or the protection of the property covered
hereby, or the prosecution or defense of any action
or proceeding in which any of the Trust Fund may
be involved.
5. The respective interests of beneficiaries in
the Trust Fund created hereby shall in no case vest
in such beneficiaries until they, respectively, shall
become entitled to receive and demand, absolutely
and forthwith, the income or principal of the said
Trust Fund to which they, respectively, may be entitled hereunder, and such beneficiaries shall have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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· no control whatsoever over, or interest in said Trust
Fund except as herein provided ; and they shall have
no right or authority to assign or anticipate any
income or share to which they may be entitled under
the provisions of this Agreement, and the interests
of said beneficiaries, and each of them, either in the
principal or the income shall not be liable in any
manner or to any extent for the obligations or liabilities, voluntary or involuntary, of the ,said beneficiaries, or either or any of them, of whatsoever
character.
6. In the event that there shall be no beneficiaries, named herein, living at the time of the
final distribution of the said Trust Fund, then, and
in this event, the entire Trust Fund shall revert to
the estate of Henry A. Alexander, and be distributed
in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah
governing estates of deceased persons.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the said Trustors
have hereunto set their hands and seals, and the
Trustee to signify its acceptance of the Trust hereby
created, has caused these presents to be executed on
the day and year herein first above written.
(s)
(s)

Henry A. Alexander
Emily Jane Alexander
FIRST PARTIES

ZION'S SAVINGS BANK & TRUST COMPANY
BY (s) Wm. McEwan, Its Cashier
SECOND PARTY
Certain real property described in the exhibit to the
trust agreement (R. 7) had been acquired by Henry A.
Alexander in 19?0 by a Warranty Deed in which he was
the sole grantee (R. 52).
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Subsequent to the execution of this agreement, Emily
J. Alexander died. On November 3, 1936, Henry A. Alexander was married to Defendant, Hannah Wilson Alex~ ander, sister of his first wife, at Salt Lake City, Utah. On
~: May 21, 1940, Henry A. Alexander executed an instrument
entitled "Withdrawal of Property From Trust'' which de..r· scribed the real property referred to in the exhibit to the
:: trust agreement, acknowledged receipt of this property
and released the trustee from any obligation in relation to
it (Exhibit 4). The property was then conveyed, at his
request, to Louis DeYoung and Louise S. DeYoung, his wife.
In consideration for the transfer by Henry A. Alexander
of the property withdrawn from the trust, the DeYoungs,
at his request and pursuant to an agreement with him conveyed to Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company the real
-· property involved in this case, known as 685 East 3065
.-.. South, Salt Lake County, Utah.
On July 11, 1940, almost four years after his marriage
to defendant, Henry A. Alexander addressed a letter to
Zion's Savings Bank & Trust Company for the purpose of
amending the trust agreement (Exhibit 2). This letter
reads as follows :
Zions Savings Bank and Trust Company
Trustee Under Trust No. 324
Gentlemen:
Pursuant to the right reserved in the above
agreement to change the terms thereof, I have
elected and do by these presents elect to change. the
provisions of said agreement as follows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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My wife, ·Emily J. Alexander, named in said
agreement is now deceased and I have remarried;·
my present wife's name is Hannah Wilson Alexander, and I desire that the following paragraph
shall be incorporated in the original trust agreement
as though originally a part thereof :
"In the event Hannah Wilson Alexander shall
survive Ifenry A. Alexander she shall be .entitled to
the use and occupancy of the family home at 685
East ~065 South, for so long as she shall desire to
occupy the same. This right in her, however, shall
not extend to a life estate so that she would be enabled to rent the property to a third person, but it
shall be confined to her personal use and occupancy.
In the event there are funds in the Trust Estate for
the payment of taxes on said property and its maintenance, she shall have the use and occupancy as
aforesaid free of all expense or upkeep and the
taxes ; _but in the event there are not funds in the
Trust Es~ate for the payment of these items, it will
necessarily be her oblig~tion to pay the same as they
fall due. If the said Hannah Wilson Alexander does
not survive Henry A. ~lexander, then upon his death
distribution of the Trust Estate. shall ·be made as
hereinafter provided. If she does survive him, then
upon her death, such distribution shall likewise be
made."
Further I hereby declare said original · trust
agreement as hereby a~ended to be in full force and
effect.
(s) Henry A. Alexander
TRUSTOR
During the remainder of his lifetime, Henry A. Alexander paid the taxes on the above property and had the
full and unrestricted possession and control thereof (R.
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4). He and his wife, Hannah Wilson Alexander, lived upon
said property after its acquisition until his death in June,
1943 (R. 45). From the date of her husband's death until
May, 1952, the defendant continued to reside on the prop- .
erty, make the necessary repairs to the home and premises,
and paid all of the taxes (R. 46). Since May of 1952, due
to her advanced age and_ poor health, the defendant has
lived with her son (R. 27, 46). She was unable to appear
at the trial of this case.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT HER ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY SINCE THE
PURPORTED TRUST WAS ILLUSORY AND
TESTAMENTARY IN NATURE AND SHOULD
NOT liAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO DEFEAT
HER INTEREST.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT HER UNDIVIPED ONE-THIRD
STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID.PROPERTY
SINCE HER DECEASED HUSBAND IN ANY
EVENT OWNED THE F'ULL AND COMPLETE
EQUITABLE TITLE TO SAID PROPERTY INCLUDING ALL INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT HER UNDIVIDED ONE-THIRD
STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY
SINCE IN ANY EVENT HER INTEREST
WOULD HAVE ATTACHED AT THE TIME
TilE PROPERTY WAS PURCHASED AND
CONVEYED TO THE TRUSTEE.

POINT IV
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
DEFENDANT AT ANY TIME RELINQUISHED
OR PARTED WITH HER INTEREST IN SAID
PROPERTY.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT HER ONE-THIRD STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY SINCE THE
PURPORTED TRUST WAS ILLUSORY AND
TESTAMENTARY IN NATURE AND SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO DEFEAT
HER INTEREST.
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the trial
court erred in holding that under the facts as stated above
the .appellant, Hannah Wilson Alexander, was not entitled
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to an undivided one-third interest in said property or the
proceeds thereof. Defendant's claim to an interest in this
property arises by virtue of Section 74-4-3 U. C. A. ( 1953)
which reads in part as follows :
"One-third in value of all the legal or equitable
estates in real property possessed by the husband at
any time during the marriage, to which the wife
has made no relinquishment of her rights, shall be
set ~part as her property in fee simple, if she sur- .
vives him.
"
So far as defendant has been able to ascertain, with
the exception of the argument made under Point III, this
Court has never considered the issues similar to those raised
by this appeal. The decisions of this Court have, however,
tended to favor the upholding of the wife's statutory dower
interest whenever it could possibly be justified under the
facts of the particular case.
It is defendant's first contention_ that the purported
trust created by defendant's husband and his former wife
was illusory and testamentary in nature and was, for the
purpose of determining defendant's rights under the above
statute, void. An examination of the provisions of the pur-·
ported trust agreement as they existed at the time defendant and Henry A. Alexander were married reveals that
duri.ng his lifetime, he parted with nothing. While the instrument in form purports to create a trust, in substance
it in no way changed his ownership or control over the
property. During his lifetime, he retained the power to
revoke the trust, to change the beneficiary, to modify its
terms in any respect he desired and in addition he retained
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the full and complete beneficial use and enjoyment of the
property ( R. 4) . He was in no way restricted in his power
to ~ell or dispose of the property, as indeed the sale of the
first parcel of property held in trust indicates. During
Alexander's lifetime, the Bank had no right to control or
manage the trust res in any manner whatsoever. He was
required by the agreement to pay the taxes and in fact did
so until his death. Had Henry A. Alexander retained a fee
simple title, he could not have had any greater rights or
powers over this property. Complete fee simple ownership
in property gives one the uncontrolled right to enjoy the .
use of the san1e in any manner he pleases and to trans~er
or convey it in whole or in part during his lifetime or upon
his death. I-Ienry A. Alexander had all of these rights. He
parted with nothing until his death. The trust agreement
was purely testamentary.
The validity of a purported trust very similar to that
involved in this case was considered by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Betker
v. Nalley, 140 F. 2d 171 (1944). The trust in that case contained two parcels of land. The settlor retained the beneficial use of the property during her lifetime together with
the power to direct the trustees to convey or mortgage· the
land at any time. Upon her death, the property was to be
sold and the proceeds divided among certain of the settlor's
children. The trust was thus in all respects similar to the
one involved in this case. After considering the question,
the Court concluded that such a trust was testamentary in
nature and invalid. At page 173, the Court states:
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"The only thing the grantor parted with irrevocably was the remainder of the trust property, if
there should be any remainder after her death; and
the only possibility that any discretion or power
might have to be exercised by her trustees after her
death arose from the possibility that she might elect
not to dispose of the entire trust property before
her death. Even in that event they were to be mere
channels through which title would flow for the purpose of distribution. It seems obvious, therefore,
that the deed of June, 1930, was ineffective to create
a trust. Instead, it was, and was intended to be,
merely testamentary in character."
I

In many cases where Courts have been faced with this
question, it has been held that where the settlor parts with
nothing during his lifetime, no valid trust is created and
unless the statutes relating to the execution of wills are
complied with, the conveyance must fail.
In Warsco v. Oshkosh Sav. & Tr. Co., 182 Wis. 458,
196 N. W. 829 (1924), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
held:
"An instrument whereby donor retains or may
retain _the whole beneficial interest in trust property by execution of the instrument according to its
terms does not constitute a valid trust.
In
such cases the so-called trustee is only the agent -of
the donor. And it has uniformly been ·held that a
devise or bequest in trust which is subject to the
future directions of the donor is void unless executed
in conformity with the statute of wills."
A number of cases have considered the validity of
trusts of this type under similar circumstances to those
raised in the present case. Under the laws of New York,
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a widow is allowed to elect upon the death of her husband
whether or not she will take her intestate share or property
devised to her by her husband. An exception to this rule
is made in the case where a valid trust has been created
with income payable to the surviving wife. The New York
Courts have uniformly held that a trust such as involved
in the present case is invalid so far as'· defeating the wife's
election to claim an outright interest in the property. In ·
l'leunnan v. Dore, 175 N.Y. 371, 9 N. E. 2d 966 (1937), the
deceased husband had created a trust with income reserved
for life, power to revoke and control over the trustee in the
management of the property. After first determining that
the intention of the settlor was not material, the Court held
the purported trust invalid. The opinion specifically notes
that:
"The settlor reserves substantially the same
rights to enjoy and control the disposition of the
property as he previously had possessed."
The Court's conclusion is summarized as follows:
"Judged by the substance, not by the form, the
testator's conveyance is illusory, intended only as a
mask for the effective retention by the settlor of
the property which in form he had conveyed. We
do not attempt now to formulate any general test of
of how far a settlor must divest himself of his interest in the trust property to render the conveyance
more than illusory. Questions of whether reservation of the income or of a power of revocation, or
both, might even without reservation of the power
of control be sufficient to show that the transfer
was not intended in good faith to divest the settlor
of his property must await decision until such ques-
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tion arises. In this case it is clear that the settlor
never intended to divest himself of his property."
For other New York cases reaching the same result,

see:
Burns v. Turnbull, 294 N. Y. 889, 62 N. E. 2d
785 (1945)
Bodner v. Feit, 247 App. Div. 119, 286 N. Y. S.
814 (1936)
Other Courts considering the question have reached the
same conclusion:

Bolles v. Toledo Trust Company, 144 Ohio St.
195, 58 N. E. 2d 381 ( 1944)
Harris v. Harris, 72

N~

E. 2d 378 (1947)

Russell v. Webster, 213 Mass .. 491, 100 N. E.
637 (1913)
Rabbitt v. Gaither, 67 Md. 97, 8 Atl. 744 (1887)
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Section 57
(2) reads as follows:
"Where the settlor transfers property in trust
and reserves not only a beneficial life estate and a
power to revoke and modify the trust, but also such
power to control the trustee as to the details of the
administration of the trust that the trustee is the
agent of the settlor. The disposition so far as it is
intended to take effect after his death is testamentary and invalid unless the requirements of the statutes relating to the validity of wills are complied
with.''
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The most that can be said for the trust agreement in
question is that it constituted Zion's Savings Bank & Trust
Company a mere agent or bailee of Henry A. Alexander
during his lifetime. If, as the cases above indicate, a trust
is invalid where the settlor retains a life interest plus the
power to revoke the trust and control the management of
the trust res, then certainly the present trust must fail.
In the present case, the trustee was given no duties whatsoever during the lifetime of Alexander. The property was
in the settlor's possession and subject to his sole and exclusive control and management. It is respectfully submitted that at least for the purpose of determining the existence and validity of a wife's statutory dower right, this
trust cannot be upheld.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT HER UNDIVIDED ONE-THIRD
STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY
SINCE HER DECEASED HUSBAND IN ANY
EVENT 0\VNED THE FULL AND COMPLETE
EQUITABLE TITLE TO SAID PROPERTY INCLUDING ALL INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP.
By its very terms, Section 74-4-3 U. C. A. (1953) gives
to the wife an undivided one-third interest in the equitable
estates in real property possessed by the husband at any
time during marriage.. ~ssuming the trust created by
Henry A. Alexander was valid, how can it possibly be denied that during his lifetime he had an equitable estate
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in the property in question? The very most that the trustee
held was the bare legal title. The settlor retained the very
greatest interest in this property possible without having
legal title. Even in states not having an express statutory
provision, it has been held that a wife may claim dower
in her husband's equitable estates.

Fletcher v. Felker, 97 F.

Sup~.

755 (1951)

It might be argued that the equitable estate of' defen-.
dant's husband was limited to a life estate and thus dower
could not attach. Such a construction, however, would render the term "equitable" as used in the statute, meaningless. All equitable estates in one sense of the word terminate upon the death of the owner. The beneficial use necessarily ceases at that time. However, if any equitable estate can be deemed a fee simple, then the interest of the
settlor under this trust should certainly qualify since in
addition to the full beneficial use he had the power to convey the property outright, change the beneficiary who
would receive it upon his death or ·even modify the trust
to provide that it would continue beyond his lifetime. The
only limitations present were those restricting the creation
or existence of any equitable interest. For a case holding
that the unequivocal power of absolute disposition elevates '
an equitable life estate into a fee simple, see National
Surety Co. v. Jarrett, 121 S. E. 291 (1924).
It has been said that whether or not dower attaches to
a particular estate is dependent upon whether or not the
husband at the time of his death is in a position to enforce
a conveyance of the property.
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Kathman

v.

Sheehan, 331 Ill. 420, 163 N. E.

692 (1928)
Under this test, certainly the wife's statutory dower right
should attach, since as noted above, her husband at the time
of his death had the uncontrolled power to convey the property.
While there are relatively few cases considering the
question of whether or not dower attaches to the equitable
estate of a beneficiary under a trust, the Courts that have
considered the question, have had little difficulty upholding
the wife's dower interest. In Chalk v. Chalk, 291 Ky. 702,
165 S. W. 2d 534 (1942), the Court noted:
"It may be observed that there is a distinction
bet\veen a husband's mere equity in land or the holding of title as an agent or trustee and an equitable
title of a character that entitles him to have or enforce a conveyance of the legal or fee simple title,,
i. e., \Vhen he is seized of a beneficial interest. The
decedent Jule Chalk had such title. Therefore, it
makes no difference whether it should be held that
the decedent had legal title to the property subject to
the liens of his son, or that he owned an equitable ·
title, for it is manifest that the son 'was seized of
an estate in fee simple' for the use of the father.
That being the condition, the widow had dower in it.
The wife's inchoate right of dower attached when the
property was acquired, and not having joined in the
conveyance of the part sold in 1929, her potential
right became consummated as a vested one at the
husband's death and the widow is entitled to have
it recognized."
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In the more recent case of Pursifull's Adm'x v. Pursifull, 299 Ky. 245, 184 S. W. 2d 967 (1944), the same Court
said:
"In the absence of a specific statute there is
some conflict in the decisions as to whether a widow
is entitled to dower in an equitable estate of her
husband, but, as said in 17 Am. Jr., Dower, § 39:
'A freehold interest as cestui que trust is now recognized as an adequate basis for dower, since in
many states the statutes specifically or by necessary
implication provide for dower in equitable estates,
or, as some of the authorities put it, a dowable quality is imparted to trust estates by the statutes.'"

-

.

F.
The case of Meyer v. Barnett, 60 W. Va. 467, 56 S. yl.
206, was almost identical to the case at bar. A husband
conveyed property to a trustee for the use and benefit of
himself and to collect the rents, issues and profits and to
pay to him the net amount thereof after expenses. The
husband had the absolute and unlimited power of disposition over the land and coulq direct the trustee to convey
it to whomever he pleased. Upon his death, that portion of
the property that was undistributed was to be conveyed
to his children. After considering the argument that the
most the husband had was a life estate, the Court concluded
that, looking at the instrument as a whole, the grantorhusband remained the owner of at least an equitable estate
in fee simple and the widow was entitled to dower in the
land. The Court was impressed by the fact that although
the income from the property would only be paid to the
grantor during his lifetime, he had ·the absolute power of
disposition over the property.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
Other cases have recognized a wife's right to dower
in a husband's equitable estate of this nature.

Burhans v. Burhans, 121 Atl. 749 (N. J. Eq.
1923)

Wildeman v. Wildeman, 130 Atl. 717 (N. J. Eq.,
1925)

Telis v. Telis, 132 N. J. Eq. 135, 26 Atl. 2d 249
(1942)

Fletcher v. Felker, 97 F. Supp., 755 (1951)
Pope v. Bain, 6 N. J. 351, 78 Atl. 2d 820 (1951)
If the word "equitable" in the Utah dower statute is
to be given any effect whatsoever the defendant in this
case is entitled to her statutory one-third interest in the
property held in trust for her husband dur~ng his lifetime.
Henry A. Alexander had as great an equitable estate in this
property as could oonceivab~y have been created.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT HER UNDIVIDED ONE-THIRD
STATUTORY INTEREST IN SAID PROPERTY
SINCE IN ANY EVENT HER INTEREST
WOULD HAVE ATTACHED AT THE TIME
THE PROPERTY WAS PURCHASED AND
CONVEYED TO THE TRUSTEE.
Apart from the above arguments, there is a third basis
upon which the defendant's dower right can and should be
sustained. On May 21, 1940, Henry A. Alexander withdrew
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~ from the trust the real property described in the exhibit

to the original trust agreement (Exhibit 4). On the same
day, pursuant to an exchange agreed upon between them,
this property was conveyed by Zion's Savings Bank & Trust
Company to Louis DeYoung by a quitclaim deed and Louis
DeYoung and Louise S. DeYoung, his wife, conveyed to the
trustee the property involved in this litigation. At that
time, Henry A. Alexander executed a form provided by the
trustee stating that "I now deliver to you the following:"
and described the property (Exhibit 3). There was no
doubt a contract or agreement between Henry A. Alexander
:: : and Louis DeYoung pursuant to which this sale or exchange
took place. A reading of the letter signed by Alexander
transferring the new property to the trust makes it clear
- -: that prior to the DeYoungs' formal conveyance to the trus-· -·
,. ,.
·- - tee, Henry A. Alexander became the full legal and equitable
owner of this property. Thus the statutory dower right of
the defendant became fixed as of that time.
Even if it be assumed that legal title to the property
did not pass through Alexander in the transfer: between the
time he contracted to purchase the property from DeYoung
and the actual conveyance to the trustee, he would have still
become the equitable owner of the property under an executory contract of purchase. The cases uniformly hold that
a husband's equitable interest in property under a contract
of purchase is subject to a wife's dower interest.
This question was considered by this Court in McNeil
v. McNeil, 61 Utah 141, 211 Pac. 988 (1922). The question·
there presented was whether dower attached to a husband's
interest under an installment contract or certificate of sale
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with the State for the purchase of land. In that case, before completing the payments, the husband_ entered into
an agreement to convey a one-half interest in the land to
another party. After completing the purchase price, the
third party brought suit to compel specific performance
of the contract and to recover his interest. The wife asserted her dower in an attempt to defeat this action. The
Court held that since the purchase price had not been fully
paid that no dower right attached prior to the sale to the
third party. The Court noted, however, that a wife would
be entitled to dower if the husband had performed his part
of the contract and would have been in a position to compel specific performance. In Young v. Corless, 56 Utah
564, 191 Pac. 647 (1920), this Court had held that a purchaser under such a contract was possessed with an equitable estate of inheritance "that could be mortgaged, one
that could descend to his heirs, and such as could· be alienated or encumbered as other real estate." In the McNeil
case, this pronouncement was qualified to the situation
where the purchaser had performed. I;n view of the Young
case, it would have been difficult to deny that a wife would
be entitled to dower under such circumstances. When read
with the earlier dower cases of Parks Estate, 31 Utah 261,
87 Pac. 900, and Free v. Little, 31 Utah 449, 88 Pac. 407,
there can be no doubt that upon the completion of payment
or other performance by the purchaser, his interest would
be such that his wife's dower right would attach.
The· cases on this point from other jurisdictions are
collected and summarized in an Annotation in 66 A. L. R.
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65. As to the rule where the purchaser has performed his
part of the contract, the author states :
"According to the weight of authority,. a wife
has dower in lands which her husband holds at the
time of his death under an executory contract of
purchase where the purchase price has been fully
paid and the husband is in a po~ition to compel a
conveyance to himself of the legal title. While the
reasons which the courts give for supporting this
rule are not uniform, they are generally based upon
the theory that in such a case the vendor is considered to be a trustee of the legal title for the benefit
of the purchaser, and some courts hold that such a
complete equitable title is an 'estate of inheritance'
within the meaning of the dower statutes."
For an example of the cases upholding the wife's dower
right in this situation, see:

In re Reids Estate, 26 Cal. App. 2d 362, 79 Pac.
2d 451

In re Kellchers Estate, 133 Misc. 581, 232 N. Y.
8.680
In re Bosharts Estate, 177 N. Y. S. 567, aff'd
177 N. Y. S. 574

Ehrlich v. Tritt, 316 Ill. 221, 147 N. E. 40
Knights v. Knights, 300 Ill. 618, 133 N. E. 377
We emphasize that the original property was withdrawn from the trust by Henry A. Alexander. After withdrawing the original property from the trust, he used it
to purchase and acquire the property that is ·now the subject matter of this action. The legal situation presented is
exactly the same as it would be if Henry A. Alexander had
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purchased the property for cash and directed the seller to
convey the legal title to a trustee. The moment Henry A.
Alexander withdrew the original property from the trust
he became the owner of the complete legal and equitable
title. He used this complete legal and equitable title to
purchase the property now in litigation. Having paid the
full purchase price for the property in litigation, he became the owner of the full and complete equitable title to
it. He could not cut off his wife's inchoate dower by directing the DeY oungs to convey the legal title to the trustee.

POINT IV
THERE \VAS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER
TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT THE
DEFENDANT AT ANY TIME RELINQUISHED
OR PART ED WITH HER INTEREST IN SAID
PROPERTY.
The trial court's decision in this case was in no way
predicated upon the assumption that the defendant had re-.
leased or relinquished her dower right. The Findings of
Fact, however, were not specific enough ,to preclude this
question from being raised. An argument to the effect that
the defendant had surrendered he'r dower right was made
by counsel of plaintiff, but jt gained no support from the
facts of the case.
It should be borne in mfnd that the amendment to the
Trust Agreement, which purported to give the defendant
the use and occupancy of the property after Henry A. Alex-
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ander's death was not executed until almost four years
after the parties \Vere married. There was no evidence of
an antenuptial agreement between the defendant and ~er
husband. She was not a party to the Amendment and there
was no reason to believe that she surrendered her dower
rights in return for the privilege given to her under it.
Counsel stressed the fact that the defendant owned real
property at the time of her marriage and that she later
disposed of said property. There was no relation shown,
however, between her dealings in her own separate property and the Trust created by her husband and the acquisition of the property in question. The mere fact that she
had property of her own in no way affects her dower right
in her husband's property.
A wife's dower right both at common law and under the
modified statutory provisions has been favored by the law,
and the courts have been reluctant to find a release or relinquishment of a wife's dower right in the absence of a
clear and unequivocal act on her part or where barred by
specific legislation.
Gee v. Baum, 58 Utah 445, 199 Pac. 680;
Rook v. Horton, 190 N. · C. 180, 129 S. E. 450;
Mathews v. Marsden, 230 Pac. 775, 71 Mont.
502;
.
Taliaferro v. Alexander, 80 F. 2d 172.
An examination of the record in this case- discloses no fact
or circumstances that would support a finding that the defendant had parted with her statutory one-third interest
in the property allegedly held in t_rust for her husband
Henry A. Alexander.
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CONCLUSION
On the basis of the evidence before the trial court, defendant, IIannah Wilson Alexander, was entitled to her
statutory one-third interest in the real property in question
or the proceeds thereof. Whether the proposed Trust Agreement is deemed a nullity or given full effect according to
its terms, defendant was entitled to her dower interest. A
contrary result would abrogate the plain and unambiguous
meaning of Section 74-4-3 U. C. A. 1953, and contravene
the strong policy in favor of safeguarding this right. Under
the authorities and arguments presented herein, the Decree
of the trial court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
GRANT H. BAGLEY,
D. EUGENE LIVINGSTON,
DAVID E. SALISBURY,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant.
Received two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
this _______________________ day of ____________ :-________________ , 1953.
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